This paper provides the …rst evidence about pure exporters (i.e., …rms exporting all of their output to the foreign market) -a phenomenon overlooked and cannot be explained in the existing literature. It then o¤ers a a theoretical analysis of the existence and behavior of pure exporters. In particular, pure exporters arise when the export market is su¢ ciently large -a situation more likely to hold in developing countries as opposed to large developed countries; and their productivity levels are above those of non-exporters, but below those of …rms having both domestic sales and export. These theoretical predictions are borne out in a data of Chinese manufacturing …rms for the period of 1998-2005. 
Pure Exporter: Theory and Evidence
Introduction
In the past decade, there has been a growing literature on …rm heterogeneity and exporting behavior. A dominant theoretical explanation is that more productive …rms self-select to become exporters (e.g., Melitz, 2003) . Speci…-cally, in Melitz's framework, there is a …xed cost of production, and a …xed cost of exporting but no …xed cost of selling in the domestic market. As a result, in equilibrium there are only two types of …rms: less productive …rms sell only in the domestic market, while more productive …rms have both domestic sales and export. 1 In reality, however, there are …rms exporting all of their output (called pure exporters). For example, McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) report that in their sample of …rms in Vietnam, as high as 9% of them exports all of their production. Meanwhile, from a sample of Chinese manufacturing …rms for the period of 1998-2005, we …nd that nearly 3% of …rms (17% of exporters) are pure exporters. How to explain the existence of pure exporters? And what kinds of …rms choose to become pure exporters? In this paper, we o¤er a theoretical explanation for pure exporters, and then test the theoretical predictions using a data of Chinese manufacturing …rms.
In our theoretical analysis, we build upon Melitz (2003) 's framework by relaxing its key assumption about …xed cost of selling. Instead of assuming that there is no …xed cost of selling in the domestic market but a …xed cost of exporting, we assume that there is also a …xed cost for domestic sales albeit lower than that of exporting. Under such framework, we have the same results as in Melitz (2003) when the export market is not su¢ ciently large, that is, there are just two types of …rms in equilibrium with the more productive …rms having both domestic sales and export while the less productive …rms selling only in the domestic market. However, when the export market is su¢ ciently large, there are three types of …rms in equilibrium: …rms having both domestic sales and export are the most productive, followed by pure exporters, and …nally by …rms with domestic sales only.
The intuition for our theoretical results is as follows. The pro…t functions for the three types of …rms are similar, that is, a linear function of …rm productivity, and the two key variables generating di¤erent pro…ts across the three types of …rms are the intercept (which is determined by the …xed costs 1 Existing empirical studies only include a dummy indicating whether or not a …rm exports without distinguishing pure exporters from exporters that also have domestic sales (see for example, Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999) . of operations) and the slope (which is determined by wage rate and market size). First, the three types of …rms di¤er in the …xed costs of operations (including both production and sales): …rms with both domestic sales and export have the highest …xed costs, followed by pure exporters, and …nally by …rms with domestic sales only. Second, as wage rate is the same across the three types of …rms (because production takes place in the same country), the variations in the slope variable come from the di¤erences in market size, with a bigger market size leading to a steeper slope.
It is clear that …rms with both domestic sales and export have the steepest slope among the three. However, the ranking in the slope between …rms with domestic sales only and …rms with export only depends on the relative size of the domestic market vis-à-vis the export market. When the export market is su¢ ciently larger than the domestic market, …rms with both domestic sales and export have the steepest slope, followed by pure exporters, and …nally by …rms with domestic sales only. Combined with the ranking in …xed costs of operations, it follows that …rms having both domestic sales and export are the most productive, followed by pure exporters, and …nally by …rms with domestic sales only. However, when the export market is not su¢ ciently large, …rms with domestic sales have steeper slope than pure exporters, and they dominate pure exporters as they also enjoy lower …xed costs of operations. Hence, in equilibrium, there are only two types of …rms, with the more productive …rms having both domestic sales and export while the less productive …rms selling only in the domestic market.
Next, using the data set of Chinese manufacturing …rms, we compare the three types of …rms in terms of productivity. Preliminary statistics reported in Table 1 show that …rms having both domestic sales and export always have the highest rank among the three types of …rms in terms of employment, …xed assets, output, and productivity. 2 On the other hand, …rms with domestic sales have the lowest ranking except in the category of …xed assets. For further empirical analysis, we regress …rm productivity on a dummy variable for domestic sales only, and a dummy variable for domestic sales and export, together with a list of industry, region and year dummies. Regression results show that …rms with domestic sales and export have the highest productivity, followed by pure exporters, and …nally by …rms with domestic sales only, consistent with our theoretical predictions.
These results are robust to the exclusion of outlying observations, to the inclusion of other …rm characteristics (such as …rm size, capital intensive, and skill labor intensity), an alternative classi…cation of Chinese domestic …rms, two sub-samples (i.e., before and after WTO accession in 2002), and two alternative estimation methods (i.e., ordered Probit and multinomial logit). In particular, there are concerns that our …nding of the sorting pattern among di¤erent types of …rms may be driven by the special trading regime in China. Speci…cally, in China there are many …rms that are allowed to import their inputs freely but have to sell all their outputs to foreign markets (namely processing trader). Meanwhile, many exporters are located in export processing zones (like Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou), which have di¤er-ent policies and regulations about importing and exporting. Moreover, pure exporters may specialize in di¤erent foreign markets than those operating in both domestic and foreign markets, and hence our productivity measure may re ‡ect rather the di¤erences in export market conditions (Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano, 2012) . To see whether our results are driven by these alternative explanations, we use the ASIF-Customs matched data, from which we observe whether an exporter is a processing trader, whether it is located in an export processing zone and how many foreign market it exports to, and …nd that our …ndings regarding the sorting pattern among …rms remain robust to the direct control for these alternative explanations.
This paper contributes to the literature by being the …rst one documenting and then o¤ering a theory to explain the existence and behavior of pure exporters. In particular, pure exporters arise when the export market is suf…ciently large vis-a-vis the domestic market, a situation more likely to hold in developing countries than in large developed countries. This also explains why we are able to identify pure exporters that are overlooked in the existing literature, because our empirical work utilizes the data from China in contrast to most of the existing work that use data from large developed countries.
2 Data, Variables, and Descriptive Analysis
Data and Variables
Our empirical analysis uses data from annual surveys of industrial …rms (ASIF) conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005. These annual surveys covered all state-owned enterprises, and those non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of …ve million Chinese currency (about US$650,000) or more. The data provides detailed information on …rms' identi…cation, operations and performance, including …rm ownership, output and export, which are of special interest to this study.
The number of manufacturing …rms varies from over 140,000 in the late 1990s to over 243,000 in 2005. The percentage of China's total exports contributed by …rms in our dataset was just below 70% in late 1990s, and was as high as 76% in 2005, indicating that our data set is highly comprehensive.
According to the classi…cation of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, …rms with more than 25% equity shares held by foreign multinationals are classi…ed as foreign a¢ liates, and the rest is classi…ed as China's domestic …rms. As the literature almost exclusively examines the exporting behavior of domestic …rms, in this study we also focus on the exporting behavior of domestic …rms, and hence simply refer to domestic …rms as …rms. To estimate total factor productivity (TFP), we …rst use the OLS regression method. Speci…cally, we use the constant value of output, de ‡ate the …xed assets by the …xed-assets investment price index and intermediate inputs by the producer price index, and estimate for …rms in each 2-digit industry and each year (see also Bernard and Jensen, 1999) . The OLS estimation of TFP, however, may su¤er from the simultaneity problem, speci…cally, input choices could be endogenously determined by unobservable productivity shocks. This may lead to an upward bias in the estimation coe¢ cients of more variable inputs such as capital (Van Biesebroeck, 2007) . We therefore use three alternative estimation methods, that is, panel …xed-e¤ect estimation, the instrumental estimation (i.e., GMM), and semi-parametric estimation 4 (i.e., Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's TFP estimation method). 5 Table  2 provides the correlation among these four di¤erent measures of TFP.
Pure Exporters
Based on their export …gures, we can potentially classify …rms into three types: …rms only sell in the Chinese market (referred to as nonexporters), …rms sell in both the Chinese and foreign markets (referred to as regular exporters), and …rms sell only in the foreign market (referred to as pure exporters). As shown in Panel A of Table 1 , for the period of 1998-2005, 80.96% of …rm-year observations belongs to the nonexporters group, 15.75% belongs to the regular exporters group, and …nally 3.29% belongs to the pure exporters group. In Panels B-E, we look at the ratios for di¤erent years, i.e., 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005. Clearly, similar patterns hold for each of these years: a majority of …rms is nonexporter and around 18% of exporters is pure exporter.
The interesting …nding of pure exporters presents a challenge to the existing …rm heterogeneity literature, as in the Melitz (2003) To have a rough idea of the behavior of pure exporters, we calculate the mean values of their several key characteristics (i.e., output, employment, …xed assets and TFP), and compare them to those of nonexporters and regular exporters. As shown in Panel A of Table 1 , we …nd that for the whole sample period (i.e., 1998-2005), regular exporters always have larger output, employment and …xed assets, and higher TFP than pure exporters. Meanwhile, pure exporters are better than non-exporters in terms of output, employment, and TFP. The same pattern holds when we compare these three types of …rms at di¤erent years (i.e., 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005) in Panels B-D of Table 1 .
To further corroborate our …nding of the ranking order among these three types of …rms, we plot the three distributions of TFP corresponding to each of the three types of …rms (i.e., nonexporters, regular exporters, and pure exporters) in Figure 1 . Clearly, we …nd that the TFP distribution of regular exporters dominates that of pure exporters, which in turn dominates that of non-exporters.
To explain such ranking order, we, in the next two sections, …rst provide a theory built upon Melitz (2003)'s framework, and then test our theoretical predictions using more rigorous empirical analysis.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we build upon Melitz (2003) 's framework to explain the existence of pure exporters and analyze its di¤erences from other two types of …rms (exporters and non-exporters).
Consider a world of two countries (i.e., home (H) and foreign (F )), two sectors (i.e., a homogeneous good (X) produced with a constant returns to scale technology and a continuum of di¤erentiated goods (Y ) produced with an increasing returns to scale technology), and one production factor (labor; mobile across sectors within a country but immobile across countries).
Following the literature, we take the homogeneous good (X) as a numéraire and assume the utility function for the di¤erentiated goods (Y ) to be a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Then the demand function for variety ! of the di¤erentiated goods Y in country l can be derived as:
where l 2 fH; F g is the index for the country;
is the measure for the size of market in country l, where M l is the number of consumers and Y l is the index of aggregate consumption of di¤erentiated goods in country l; and p l (!) is the price of variety ! in country l. The elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erentiated goods is 1=(1 ) > 1. The variety parameter ! is left out hereon as all the cases are symmetric.
The production of the di¤erentiated goods (y) takes place in the home country. The unit production cost is given by c= , where is the …rm-speci…c productivity measure drawn from a common distribution. Meanwhile, the …xed cost of production is same across all …rms and given by f p . Moreover, the transport cost of di¤erentiated goods to the foreign market takes the form of an iceberg cost, i.e., one needs t > 1 units of …nal product in order to ship 1 unit to an abroad market.
Thus far the setup is the same as in Melitz (2003) . The departure of our model from his lies in the assumption about the …xed cost of selling the di¤erentiated goods. In Melitz (2003) , it is assumed that there is zero …xed cost of selling in the home market, but a positive …xed cost of selling in the foreign market. In contrast, we assume that there is also a positive …xed cost of selling the home market (denoted by f H s ), though it is lower than the …xed cost of selling in the foreign market (denoted by f A …rm needs to decide where to sell its products. There are three possible choices: selling only in the home market (non-exporters), selling only in the foreign market (pure exporters), and selling in both home and foreign markets. For ease of exposition, we denote these three choices by (H), (F ), and (HF ), respectively.
Given the above setup, we can derive the equilibrium pro…t function for these three choices as:
where 1 is a monotonic transform of productivity ; C c 1 is a monotonic transform of unit production cost c; T t 1 is a monotonic transform of transport cost t; and I l is the market size in country l, l 2 fH; F g.
Note that the pro…t function for each of these three choices is a linear function of , and it just di¤ers in the slope term (denoted by ) and the intercept term (the negative of all the …xed costs, denoted by F ). The comparison of the …xed costs across the three choices is straightforward, in which:
where . The slope term ( ) is determined by the unit cost of production (the denominator, C) and the size of the markets (the nominator, X I l ). As the production takes place only in the home market, the three choices have the same unit cost of production, and they only di¤er in the size of the markets. The choice (HF ) involves the selling in both the home and the foreign markets, and thus it has the largest market coverage or the steepest slope term. The comparison of the slope term between the choice (H) and the choice (F ) hinges upon the relative size of the home market and the foreign market (adjusted by the transport cost). When the (transport-costadjusted) foreign market is smaller than the home market (that is,
H ), the slope term of the choice (H) is steeper than that of the choice (F ). When the (transport-cost-adjusted) foreign market is larger than the home market (that is,
, the slope term of the choice (F ) is steeper than that of the choice (H). So we have the following ranking of the slope term for these three choices:
where Figure 2 shows the optimal choice when the foreign market is not su¢ -ciently large, in which in the equilibrium there are only two types of …rms, regular exporter and nonexporters, and the former has higher productivity than the latter. Figure 3 shows the optimal choice when the foreign market is su¢ ciently large. In the equilibrium, all three types of …rms exist, and the most productive …rms choose to sell both in the home and foreign markets, the least productive …rms sell only in the home market, and those in the middle sell only in the foreign market.
We conclude our theoretical …ndings in the following Proposition:
Proposition: When the foreign market is not su¢ ciently large, in equilibrium there are only two types of …rms: the more productive …rms sell in both the home and foreign markets, while the less productive …rms sell only in the home market (the non-exporters). When foreign markets are su¢ ciently large, in equilibrium there are three types of …rms: the most productive …rms sell in both the home and foreign markets, the least productive ones sell only in the home market (the non-exporters), and those in the middle sell only in foreign markets (the pure exporters).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition for the proposition is as follows. For the case where the foreign market is not su¢ ciently large, the choice of selling only in the foreign market ( (F )) is always dominated by the choice of selling only in the home market ( (H)). This is because the former has a higher …xed costs but a smaller market coverage than the latter. Meanwhile, compared with the choice of selling in both the home and the foreign markets ( (HF )), (H) has a lower …xed costs but a smaller market coverage. Thus, the equilibrium choice depends on …rm productivity as elucidated in the literature on …rm heterogeneity and exporting behavior, with the more productive …rms choosing (HF ) while the less productive ones choosing (H).
For the case where the foreign market is su¢ ciently large, none of these three choices is always dominated by others. As we move from the choice of selling only in the home market ( (H)), to the choice of selling only in the foreign market ( (F )), and …nally to the choice of selling in both the home and foreign markets ( (HF )), the …xed costs are increasing (i.e., F (H) < F (F ) < F (HF ) ), but so are the market coverage (i.e., (H) < (F ) < (HF ) ). The equilibrium choice depends on …rm productivity, namely, the most productive …rms choose (HF ), the least productive ones choose (H), and those in the middle choose (F ).
It is interesting to point out why pure exporters do not exist in equilibrium under Melitz (2003) 's framework. In Melitz (2003) , it is assumed that the …xed cost of selling in the home market is zero (i.e., f H s = 0). Under this assumption, the choice of selling only in the foreign market ( (F )) is always dominated by the choice of selling in both the home and the foreign markets ( (HF )). This is because the former has the same …xed costs as the latter (i.e., F (F ) = F (HF ) ), but has a smaller market coverage than the latter (i.e., (F ) < (HF ) ). Intuitively, as there is no extra …xed cost of selling in the home market, …rms always have sales in the home market.
Under our framework (i.e., 0 < f
, however, pure exporters may exist in equilibrium, and the condition for its existence is that the foreign market is su¢ ciently larger than the home market. However, if this condition is not satis…ed, the choice of selling in the foreign market (or the pure exporters) is dominated by the choice of selling only in the home market (or the non-exporters), and the equilibrium choice is between selling only in the home market ( (H)) and selling in both the home and foreign markets ( (HF )) just as in Melitz (2003) .
Empirical Analysis

Main Results
To further investigate the exporting behavior of …rms in China, we estimate the following equation:
T F P f irt = + Home f irt + Home and F oreign f irt + i + r + t +" f irt (5) where T F P f irt is the TFP of …rm f in industry i, region r and year t; Home f irt is a dummy variable having value of one if …rm f sells only in the home market, and zero otherwise; Home and F oreign f irt is a dummy variable having value of one if …rm f sells in both the home and foreign markets, and zero otherwise; i , r and t are 4-digit industry dummy, region dummy, 6 and year dummy, respectively; and " f irt is the error term. To deal with the possible heteroskedasticity problem, we use the robust standard error clustered at the …rm level.
Regression results for equation (5) are reported in Table 3 . We use TFP estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 'e method as the dependent variable in Column (1), TFP estimated using OLS method as the dependent variable in Column (2), TFP estimated using panel …xed-e¤ect method as the dependent variable in Column (3), and …nally TFP estimated using GMM as the dependent variable in Column (4). It is clear that in all these regressions, the coe¢ cient for Home f irt is negative and statistically signi…cant, whereas the coe¢ cient for Home and F oreign f irt is positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that …rms having sales in both the home and foreign markets are the most productive, followed by …rms with sales only in the foreign market, and …nally, by …rms with sales only in the home market. The sorting pattern in terms of productivity across the three types of …rms reinforces our preliminary comparison in Table 1 and leads support to our theoretical predictions in the Proposition in Section 2.
Note that our Proposition suggests that pure exporters arise only when the export market is su¢ ciently large vis-à-vis the domestic market. It is reasonable to argue that the condition of su¢ ciently large export market holds more likely for developing countries such as China as compared with large developed countries such as the United States. Indeed our identi…cation of the existence of pure exporters among the Chinese manufacturers lends support to the above argument. To further provide corroborative evidence for such argument, we, from the Chinese Customs data (from 2000 to 2006), obtain the information about which foreign markets each 3-digit industryprovince exports to and how many. Based on such information, we calculate for each industry-province a weighted average GDP of all these foreign markets with the weight being the export share as a proxy for the size of the concerned …rm's potential export market (denoted as Export Market Size). 7 Speci…cally, Export Market Size is constructed as follows
where i, r, j, and t represent three-digit industry, region, foreign country, and year; ! irjt
is the export share of foreign country j; and GDP jt is the GDP of foreign country j at yeat t. To avoid the issue that the observed exporter status and the number of export markets are jointly determined, we use the lagged values in the regressions.
We, in Columns 1-2 of Table 4 , …rst conduct the …rm-level analysis, in which we pool all the …rm-year observations and regress an indicator of Pure Exporter on Export Market Size along with several …rm characteristics (such as TFP, wage, …rm size, and capital labor ratio) and the dummies of industry, region and year. Clearly, we …nd that it is more likely to observe a pure exporter if the export market size is larger, leading further support to our theoretical predictions.
In Columns 3-4 of Table 4 , we use another speci…cation, that is, we aggregate all the relevant …rm-year level variables to the industry-region-year level (using the mean values), and regress the ratio of pure exporters (in terms of number) in an industry-region cell on Export Market Size along with all the controls. It is found that the share of pure exporters is higher in industryregion with larger potential export markets, consistent with the …rm-level analysis in Columns 1-2 of Table 4 and our theoretical predictions.
Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we conduct a series of robustness checks on the productivity ranking of nonexporters, pure exporters, and regular exporters. As the results with each of these four measures of TFP are similar, we only report the estimation results using TFP estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 's method as the dependent variable to save space.
Outlying Observations. To address the concern that our results could be driven by some outlying observations, we exclude the top and bottom 1% observations in our sample and repeat the analysis. The results shown in Column 1 of Table 5 demonstrate clearly that out …ndings in Table 3 remain robust.
Additional Controls. To make sure that our …ndings are not entirely driven by other …rm characteristics, we alternatively incorporate Firm Size (measured as the logarithm of employment), Capital Intensive (measured as the logarithm of capital labor ratio), and Skilled Labor Intensity (measured as the logarithm of the ratio of labor with collage degree or above) in the regression analysis. 8 The result reported in Columns 2-4 of Table 5 reveal that our …ndings remain robust to the inclusion of these additional …rm characteristics.
Alternative De…nition of Domestic Firms. We use an alternative de…nition of domestic …rms -the o¢ cial ownership type reported by …rms in the survey -instead of that implied by equity ownership. Speci…cally, there are …ve types of ownership: state-owned …rms, collectively-owned …rms, jointstock companies, privately-owned …rms, and foreign-invested …rms. We treat …rms with the …rst four types of ownership as domestic …rms. As shown in Column 5 of Table 5 , our …ndings remain robust to this alternative de…nition of domestic …rms.
Di¤erent Sub-samples. We split the whole sample into two subsamples to take care of the possible changes of exporting behavior over time. In particular, China entered into the WTO near the end of 2001, which might facilitate the export of China's domestic …rms and enlarge the foreign market vis-à-vis the domestic market. Hence, we split the sample period into two, the pre-WTO period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) and the post-WTO period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , and repeat the analysis. As shown in Columns 6-7 of Table 5 , the estimated coe¢ cients for Home f irt are negative and statistically signi…cant for both the pre-and the post-WTO periods, though the magnitude of the coe¢ cient drops substantially from the pre-to the post-WTO period. Intuitively, with China's entry into the WTO, entry barriers into the foreign market are lowered down (or transport cost t drops in our model), which narrows down the productivity gap between non-exporters and pure exporters. Meanwhile, the estimated coe¢ cients for Home and F oreign f irt are positive and statistically signi…cant for both the pre-and the post-WTO periods, with similar magnitudes. Intuitively, the productivity gap between pure exporters and …rms with sales in both the home and foreign markets is driven by the …xed cost of selling in the home market as well as the size of the home market, none of which is signi…cantly a¤ected by China's entry into the WTO.
Alternative Estimation Methods. To re ‡ect the self-selection feature of exporting behavior by …rms in terms of their productivity levels as stated in the Proposition, we use two alternative estimation methods, that is, ordered Probit and multinomial logistic estimation. Speci…cally, we construct a new variable, called Exporting Status f irt , which takes a value of 1 if a nonexporter, a value of 2 if a pure exporter, and a value of 3 if a regular exporter. According to the order of self-selection found in the Proposition, we have 8 <
:
Exporting Status f irt = 1 Exporting Status f irt = 2 Exporting Status f irt = 3
where is …rm productivity. The Ordered Probit regression estimates not only the e¤ect of …rm productivity, but also the two cuto¤ points (i.e., 1 , and 2 ), from which we can test whether they are in the increasing order and statistically di¤erent. Regression results are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 6 (without and with …rm controls, respectively). It is found that in both regressions the estimated coe¢ cients of …rm productivity are positive and statistically signi…cant. These results indicate that along with the increase in productivity, a …rm is more likely to switch from nonexporter to pure exporter (i.e., those with productivity above 1 ), and to exporter (i.e., those with productivity above 2 ). Moreover, in both speci…cations, the estimated cuto¤ points of productivity (i.e., 1 ,and 2 ) display an increasing order, that is, 1 < 2 , and the Chi2 tests show that this order is statistically signi…cant. One potential concern of the Ordered Probit estimation is that it already imposes an order on the outcome choice, that is, outcomes with higher values are better (or worse) than those with lower values. As a way of checking whether our …ndings are due to this arti…cial ordering problem, we also use the multinomial logit regression. Set Exporting Status f irt = 1 as the base outcome and the multinomial logistic estimation generates two relative risk ratios, corresponding to the other two outcomes (that is, Exporting Status f irt = 2 and Exporting Status f irt = 3). A relative risk ratio for the explanatory variable X k measures the change in the predicted odds favoring Exporting Status f irt = j 2 f2; 3g relative to the base outcome Exporting Status f irt = 1 associated with an 1-unit increase in X k . In other words, the relative risk ratio (rrr j1 ) for X k takes the following form:
Hence, rrr j1 > 1 means that with an increase in X k , a …rm is more likely to choose outcome value j relative to the base outcome; whereas rrr j1 < 1 means that with an increase in X k , a …rm is less likely to choose outcome value j relative to the base outcome. Regression results are reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 6 (without and with …rm controls, respectively). As results are consistent across these two speci…cation, we explain our …ndings using the results in Column 10. The relative risk ratio for outcome ExportingStatus f irt = 2 over basic outcome ExportingStatus f irt = 1 (rrr 21 ) is found to be 1:392 > 1 and statistically signi…cant. This means that with an increase in …rm productivity level in the last period, a …rm is more likely to switch from selling only in the home market to selling only in foreign markets, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction in the Proposition. Given the relative risk ratio rrr 31 , we can calculate the relative risk ratio for outcome ExportingStatus f irt = 3 over outcome ExportingStatus f irt = 2, that is rrr 32 = rrr 31 =rrr 21 = 2:268 > 1:
This means that an increase in …rm productivity level is associated with a higher probability of selling in both the home and foreign markets than selling only in foreign markets, which is again consistent with the theoretical prediction in the Proposition.
Other Potential Explanations. Thus far, we have documented that the productivity level of pure exporters lies in between the levels of nonexporters and regular exporters, and we explain such …nding as the self-selection by …rms in terms of their productivity levels. However, there are some other potential explanations, e.g., related to the special trading regime in China. Speci…cally, when China opened its economy after 1978, it …rst established some export processing zones (e.g., Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou) and only allowed exports and imports within these special zones, to protect its fragile domestic economy. Given that …rms located in export processing zones are export-oriented (and many are pure exporters) and these special zones have some favorable policies toward exporters, one may be concerned that our …ndings of pure exporters could be driven by the location of these …rms, in particular, the export processing zones. To address this concern, we …rst match our ASIF …rm-level data to the China Customs data, 9 from which we obtain the information about whether an exporter is located in an export processing zone or not. And then we construct an additional control, namely Export Processing Zone, which takes a value of 1 for exporters located in the export processing zone and a value of 0 for exporters located outside the export processing zone and nonexporters. As shown in Column 1 of Table 7 , our main results regarding the ranking order among the three di¤erent types of …rms remain robust to this additional control, indicating that our results are not driven by the location of the exporters.
Meanwhile, as another strategy to open but also protect the domestic economy, foreign …rms were allowed to import their inputs freely but had to sell all their outputs to foreign markets, so called processing trade.
10 Given the pure exporter nature of these processing traders and the technology advancement of foreign …rms, it could be possible that our results are driven by these processing traders. To address this concern, we again use the ASIFCustoms matched data, from which we collect the information whether an exporter conduct processing trade, ordinary trade, or both. We then construct an additional control, namely Processing Trader, which takes a value of 1 if an exporter conducts any processing trade and 0 otherwise. Regression results are reported in Column 2 of Table 7 . Clearly, our main results still remain robust. 11 Finally, there is a concern that pure exporters may specialize in di¤erent foreign markets than those operating in both domestic and foreign markets, and hence our productivity measure may re ‡ect rather the di¤erences in export market conditions (Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano, 2012). To address this concern, we use the Export Market Size variable constructed in Section 4.1 to capture the potential exposure of di¤erent foreign markets to di¤erent …rms and include it as an additional control in the analysis. Regression results are reported in Column 3 of Table 7 . Again, we …nd that our main results remain robust to this additional control.
In summary, the …ndings of our results robust to the control for export processing zones, processing trader or the size of export markets imply that our results cannot be mainly explained by these alternative theories.
Conclusion
This paper studies the existence and behavior of pure exporters, which are overlooked and cannot be explained by the existing literature. Building upon Melitz (2003) 's framework, we …rst identify the condition for the existence of pure exporters, that is, the su¢ ciently large foreign market relative to the domestic market. We then show that in the presence of pure exporters, their productivity levels are above those of non-exporters, but below those of …rms having both domestic sales and export. To examine the relevance of these theoretical predictions, we use a data of manufacturing …rms for the period of 1998-2005 from China, for which the foreign market is arguably much larger compared with the domestic market. From this data, we …nd quite a substantial number of pure exporters, and their productivity ranking vis-à-vis the other two types of …rms highly consistent with our theoretical predictions.
in export processing zones, and …nd similar results (available upon request).
< I
H . In this case, the choice (F ) (selling only in the foreign market or pure exporting) is dominated by the choice (H) (selling only in the home market or domestic sale only), as
The …rst inequality comes as
H , while the second inequality is due to the assumption 0 < f (1 )
Thus, we have a clear dichotomy that when the foreign market is not suf…ciently large, more productive …rms sell in both the home and the foreign markets and less productive …rms sell only in the home market. Next, let us consider the case that foreign market is su¢ ciently large, i.e., I F T
> I
H . In this case, in the equilibrium, there are three available choices: (H) , (F ) and (HF ).
Denote the cuto¤ point Thus, the most productive …rms sell in both the home and foreign markets, followed by those selling in the foreign market only, and then by those selling in the home market only. 
